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 CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE 
 Hegel: Philosophy as a 
Kind of Skepticism 
 DIETMAR H.  HEIDEMANN 
 1 INTRODUCTION 
 Hegel is not a skeptic, although he believes philosophy to be a kind of skepticism. 
This view looks paradoxical, but it isn’t. Hegel, as many philosophers, holds that 
skepticism can take different forms. According to his account of philosophical 
doubt, there are untrue, misconceived forms of skepticism, that is, ordinary versions 
of skepticism according to which we cannot know whether our beliefs are true, 
and there is genuine skepticism that coincides with true philosophy itself. True 
philosophy realizes that skeptical doubt is to be conceived as an integral part of 
rationality and that, although skepticism as such cannot be overcome, it is not flying 
in the face of reason either, since genuine skepticism has the positive function of 
productively contributing to true philosophical cognition. 
 Already in his infamous essay  On the Relation between Skepticism and Philosophy 
(1801), Hegel distinguishes “skepticism that is one with philosophy” from 
“skepticism that is sundered from it.” The latter “can be divided into two forms, 
according to whether it is or is not directed against Reason” ( Hegel 2000 : 330, 
translation modified). For Hegel, “genuine skepticism” is “skepticism that is one 
with philosophy” because this form of skepticism represents, in his terminology, the 
“negative side” that each true philosophy has in that it is “directed against everything 
limited” or “the whole soil of finitude” ( 2000 : 322–323). Genuine skepticism is 
all-comprising and hence not limited to doubts about the existence of the external 
world, sense perception, or human reasoning in general. It also has speculative 
reason or metaphysics as its object but, unlike skepticism that is sundered from 
philosophy, not as its target. Unlike ordinary kinds of skepticism, genuine skepticism 
does not just call into doubt arbitrary epistemic claims but takes skeptical doubt 
to systematically demonstrate that certain types of cognition are misconceived in 
principle. Further, according to Hegel, the systematic skeptical proof that certain 
types of cognition are untrue necessarily belongs to the idea of what true philosophy 
consists in because in the end skeptical doubt contributes to the constitution of the 
true as a whole. In what follows, I present the arguments Hegel puts forward in 
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favor of this rather challenging account of skepticism. In Section 2, I discuss the 
celebrated conception of “self-fulfilling skepticism” of the  Phenomenology of Spirit 
(1807) that is supposed to overcome untrue types of cognition in order to promote 
“absolute knowing.” In Section 3, I debate Hegel’s more advanced view according 
to which genuine skepticism must be construed as dialectic. 1 
 2 SKEPTICISM AND HISTORY 
OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
 The  Phenomenology of Spirit , which Hegel conceives as a systematic introduction 
to metaphysics as true philosophical science, deals with the problem of justifying 
true knowledge. The project of justifying true knowledge is directly connected with 
skeptical doubts because epistemic justification presupposes a criterion by means 
of which it can be decided whether knowledge is justified; however, for the skeptic 
the criterion itself is questionable. Although theories of epistemic justification like 
coherentism or contextualism claim to be able to do without a criterion and thereby 
to dissolve skepticism, Hegel, in the  Phenomenology at least, explicitly affirms that 
a criterion of justification is indispensable. The problem of the non-justifiability 
of the criterion originates in ancient (Pyrrhonian) skepticism, which for Hegel is 
substantially more sophisticated than modern skepticism (see  Hegel 1969 –1971: 
XIX 358–403;  Forster 1989 : 9–35;  Heidemann 2007 : 117–198). The Pyrrhonist 
Agrippa models it as a skeptical trilemma. The general argument runs as follows: 
the logical “criterion of truth” serves as “the standard regulating belief in reality or 
unreality”; however, it is unprovable. For to settle the philosophical dispute over 
the existence of a criterion of truth, a criterion is required to determine whether 
there is one or not. Now, this criterion can 
 (i)  be proven in a  circular way because the proof of a criterion already requires 
an accepted criterion by means of which it can be proven; or 
 (ii)  be a  dogmatic “assumption” that involves simply presupposing its 
existence; or 
 (iii)  be proven by another criterion, which in turn will be proven by another one, 
and so on  ad infinitum . (cf. Sextus Empiricus  1933 : I 21-24, II 18-21 
 In any of the three cases, the justification of the criterion necessarily fails. Hegel, 
who was familiar with the Pyrrhonists’ writings, claims in the  Phenomenology to 
have found a solution to it. In particular, he thinks that he has developed a procedure 
that justifies the criterion without making unjustified external presuppositions. 
According to Hegel, the  aporia of the criterion, or “standard” ( Ma ß stab ) as he most 
frequently calls it, arises because the “investigation and  examination of the reality 
of cognition ” cannot manage “without some presupposition that can serve as its 
underlying criterion” ( 1977 : sec. 81). From this there results a “contradiction” 
( 1977 : sec. 82) or an  aporia . Hegel argues as follows: 
 An examination consists in applying an accepted standard, and in determining 
whether something is right or wrong on the basis of the resulting agreement 
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or disagreement of the thing examined; thus the standard as such (and Science 
likewise if it were the criterion) is accepted as the  essence or as the  in-itself ( an 
sich ). But here, where Science has just begun to come on the scene, neither 
Science nor anything else has yet justified itself as the essence or the in-itself; 
and without something of that sort it seems that no examination can take place. 
( 1977 : sec. 81)  
 This version of the  aporia essentially resembles Sextus Empiricus’s approach, even 
though Hegel does not explicitly mention the Pyrrhonian background here (cf. 
 Claesges 1981 : 68–74 and 77–96). Hegel’s solution to the problem is based on 
the analysis of epistemic consciousness. It can be outlined as follows: in order to 
prevent the unjustified presupposition of the criterion, in the introduction to the 
 Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel introduces the concept of Science as it “comes on the 
scene” ( 1977 : sec. 76). Science is characterized at this stage first as an “appearance,” 
that is, a form of cognition emerging alongside other epistemic claims. Secondly, as 
an “emerging” science, it is “not yet Science in its developed and unfolded truth.” 
As this nascent Science competes with other concepts of cognition, due to skeptical 
equipollence it cannot simply declare its superiority since this would be nothing but a 
dogmatic “assurance” ( 1977 : sec. 76). Therefore, Hegel’s strategy is to show that the 
emerging Science develops into true Science by turning against the mere appearance 
of knowledge and thereby abandoning its provisional status in order to overcome 
untrue modes of cognition. However, to the extent that the “exposition of how 
knowledge makes its appearance” ( 1977 : sec. 76) is nothing but the “ examination of 
the reality of cognition ” ( 1977 : sec. 81), the  Phenomenology obviously cannot avoid 
relapsing into the  aporia , since that examination presupposes a “standard” of its 
own. In other words, Science must provide the standard of truth although it is just 
about to emerge and is not yet true and real, that is, justified. Hegel now argues that 
a standard of justification is indispensable but cannot be dogmatically presupposed 
as an external criterion. It therefore must fall into the sphere of consciousness itself. 
The standard is an internal factor of consciousness, for “truth” and “knowledge” 
prove to be “abstract determinations” that “occur in consciousness” itself ( 1977 : 
sec. 82). Examination of the relation between these determinations yields the insight 
that “[c]onsciousness provides its own criterion from within itself ” by performing 
nothing more than a “comparison” with itself ( 1977 : sec. 84). Hegel conceives of 
this as the self-creation of the standard for the distinction between knowledge and 
truth, between that which is  for consciousness and that which is  in itself outside the 
relation, for that very distinction is one that is made within the epistemic structures of 
consciousness itself. Whenever consciousness “knows” an object, this object is both 
 for it and at the same time  in itself or true, since consciousness regards the object as 
given outside of the cognitive relation. The in itself, however, is a determination that 
consciousness “affirms” within its knowledge. For Hegel these epistemic structures 
generate the standard: “Thus in what consciousness affirms from within itself as 
 being-in-itself or the  True we have the standard that consciousness itself sets up by 
which to measure what it knows” ( 1977 : sec. 84). 
 Thus, according to Hegel’s solution to the skeptical trilemma, the examination of 
knowledge consists in a comparison of consciousness with what it takes to be true. 
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If consciousness corresponds to what it takes to be true, that is, if it is in accordance 
with itself, then its knowledge meets the standard of true knowledge, produced by 
itself. This stage is achieved by consciousness at the level of true self-consciousness 
or subjectivity, that is, “absolute knowing.” In the course of its development toward 
fully-fledged subjectivity, consciousness is already following the path of science 
and hence does not have to presuppose an external standard. It is the “history of 
self-consciousness” in terms of self-fulfilling skepticism by means of which Hegel 
explains how consciousness proceeds through that development. 
 In the  Phenomenology , Hegel conceives of the “history of self-consciousness” as 
the “history of the  education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science” 
( 1977 : sec. 78). 2 The purpose of the history of self-consciousness is not to describe 
the empirical coming into being of self-consciousness on the basis of the natural, 
cultural, or social development of mankind. Rather, the conception of the history 
of self-consciousness, as Fichte and Schelling have developed it, is about the ideal 
or systematic genesis of cognitive capacities in the human mind. The idea is to 
show how the human mind develops such capacities starting with primitive forms 
of epistemic consciousness or knowledge, which in the sequel is enriched by more 
complex forms until they finally culminate in the fully developed self-conscious 
cognitive subject. 
 The  Phenomenology is arranged as an interconnected “series of forms” of 
consciousness ( 1977 : sec. 79). Hegel presents it as a development of epistemic 
claims. A form of consciousness is an idealized epistemic shape or structure of 
consciousness within a specific field like sense certainty, perception, reason, or 
spirit. The exposition of forms of consciousness is not, however, about the way 
consciousness has sense-impressions, perceptual representations, etc. Rather it deals 
with the specific epistemic claims involved in sense certainty, perception, etc., and the 
question whether consciousness meets these claims so as to acquire  true cognition. 
According to this method, each form of consciousness must have its own standard 
that makes it possible to decide whether an epistemic claim is satisfied. For example, 
the standard of sense certainty as a form of consciousness is “immediacy” ( 1977 : sec. 
90–93), that is, non-inferentiality is the standard that natural consciousness sets up as 
the criterion for the examination of the truth of its knowledge claims. So at the level 
of sense certainty, consciousness examines whether its epistemic claim, that is, beliefs 
based on sense-impressions, meet the standard of immediacy. The examination of 
this form of consciousness then proves that sense certainty does not meet its standard 
since it turns out to be inferential knowledge after all and hence, according to its own 
standard, one of “the forms of the unreal consciousness” ( 1977 : sec. 79). Thus sense 
certainty as the form or claim of immediate knowledge has to be given up, because 
all knowledge based on sense-impressions is conceptually mediated. The standard 
as such is not just an external presupposition since it is intrinsic to each form of 
consciousness and set up by consciousness itself. 3 
 This seems to be a legitimate conception to the extent that it is possible to typify 
different classes of epistemic claims according to different criteria of epistemic 
justification. However, the systematic interconnection of these claims in the 
 Phenomenology does generate a problem. According to Hegel, with the exception of 
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absolute knowing, no shape of consciousness meets its standard as the fully developed 
form of self-consciousness or self-knowledge. However, the series of the “formative 
stages” ( 1977 : sec. 28) of consciousness is not arbitrary but is said to be  complete 
as well as  necessary ( 1977 : sec. 29, 77–80) Hegel tries to guarantee this on the basis 
of the following argument: the skeptically motivated non-satisfaction of a specific 
standard not only leads to a modification of the epistemic claim of consciousness but 
also “the criterion for testing is altered,” so that the examination of consciousness 
is also an examination of “the criterion of what knowledge is” ( 1977 : sec. 85). 
From this alteration, Hegel claims, “ the new true object issues ” by a “ dialectical 
movement that consciousness exercises” ( 1977 : sec. 86). This new object is the new 
epistemic claim of consciousness, including its new standard. That is to say, with the 
exception of sense certainty as the first form of consciousness, each of the ensuing 
forms of consciousness necessarily (logically) follows from the preceding one and 
hence always contains what consciousness has learned from its previous shape. By 
this “historical” or, to be more precise, developmental and skeptical process, natural 
consciousness continuously develops into true “absolute knowing” or the completed 
subject, encompassing the entire experience consciousness has made before. 
 Although subjectivity constitutes the unity of the entire development and is 
thus the thread of this process, from beginning to end, the question of how the 
developing consciousness itself can have knowledge of the logical interconnection 
and epistemic features of the different stages remains an open one. Indeed, the 
developing consciousness does not have such knowledge. This is due to the fact that 
the conception of a history of self-consciousness presupposes the methodological 
differentiation between the developing consciousness at the first level and the 
phenomenological philosopher who establishes the theoretical links between the 
forms of consciousness at the second level. The developing consciousness ignores 
the logical relations between its different epistemic claims since the theoretical 
assessment takes place from the already fully developed philosophical standpoint. 
This is the reason why Hegel maintains that the  Phenomenology as “the way to 
science is itself already  Science ” ( 1977 : sec. 88) and therefore does not lay claim to 
unjustified external standards of epistemic examination. 4 
 Consequently, the history of self-consciousness shows, first, how the standard 
is generated by the skeptically self-examining consciousness, secondly, what the 
standard is in each particular case, and thirdly, that Hegel’s solution does not come 
down to mere subjectivism since the philosophical evaluation of the “pathway” 
is “something contributed by us” ( 1977 : sec. 87), the knowing philosopher, and 
therefore made from an objective standpoint. Nevertheless, this argument as a 
whole can be reproached with circularity because the conclusion, the standpoint of 
philosophical truth, is a constitutive element needed to make sense of the premises, 
that is, the history of self-consciousness. For, on the one hand, the history of self-
consciousness constitutes the skeptical justification of true philosophical knowledge, 
but, on the other hand, the theory already makes use of it prior to the completion 
of the whole developmental process before it is itself justified. The history of 
self-consciousness is forced to make the external presupposition of philosophical 
knowledge that explains what is going on within the skeptical process of justifying 
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the sequence of epistemic claims that consciousness raises. This difficulty might be 
the reason why Hegel in his later work further developed his account of skepticism 
by accommodating it with skepticism. 
 3 SKEPTICISM AND DIALECTIC 
 The place of true philosophy in Hegel’s system is logic conceived as metaphysics. 
Unlike the  Phenomenology , logic, as depicted in the  Science of Logic (1812–1816) 
and the  Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817–1830), does not operate 
on the basis of self-fulfilling skepticism. In the logic, skepticism rather appears 
in connection with dialectic. Hegel makes two crucial claims with respect to the 
relation between skepticism and dialectic: (a) “philosophy . . . contains the skeptical 
moment as a moment within itself—specifically as the dialectical moment” ( 1991 : 
 § 81), and (b) “skepticism” as “the dialectical moment itself is an essential one in 
the affirmative Science” ( 1991 :  § 78). Both of these claims have to be understood in 
light of the problem of “total presuppositionlessness” ( 1991 :  § 78). This problem is 
subsequent to the problem of a systematic introduction to metaphysics or logic. For 
Hegel acknowledges the skeptic’s claim that the demonstration of “Science” ( 1991 : 
 § 78), that is, philosophical science, must not make any unjustified presuppositions. 
However, employing skeptical doubt as the method of a systematic introduction 
to science would be question-begging since “Science” itself is supposed to be self-
reliant, that is, it cannot depend on a preceding justification through skepticism. 
Hence, it cannot be legitimate to construe the demonstration of “Science” as a 
procedure of skeptical justification. This, of course, means that Hegel can no longer 
hold onto the conception of the  Phenomenology as a systematic introduction to 
metaphysics or “Science.” 5 
 The fact that skepticism, particularly  Phenomenology ’s “self-fulfilling skepticism,” 
cannot perform the function of a systematic introduction to “Science” raises two 
questions: First, is there an alternative way of obtaining access to “Science,” a 
systematic way that does not violate the claim of “presuppositionlessness”? Second, 
if skepticism cannot accomplish the task of a systematic introduction, wouldn’t 
skeptical doubt be independent of, and therefore a fundamental threat to, “Science”? 
Hegel’s answer to the first question is that we can obtain access to “Science” without 
making presuppositions “by the freedom that abstracts from everything, and grasps 
its own pure abstraction, the simplicity of thinking—in the resolve to think purely” 
( 1991 :  § 78, translation modified). It is by no means clear what the “resolve to think 
purely” consists in, not least because Hegel does not further explain this concept. 
But he seems to believe that this concept represents the appropriate methodological 
procedure that enables an individual to get immediate access to the proper content 
of “Science” by pure thought. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that “Science” 
can indeed be grasped by this procedure. How then does Hegel respond to the 
second question? He clearly denies that independent skepticism is threatening to 
“Science” since according to his theory skepticism is contained within philosophy as 
“the dialectical moment” ( 1991 :  § 81). In order to see Hegel’s point, one has to recall 
his conception of “Science” or logic as metaphysics. In Hegel’s speculative idealism, 
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logic represents “the pure truth itself ” ( 1991 :  § 19). As such, it contains “objective 
thoughts” that “express the essentialities of things,” though not as a collection of 
abstract terms but as dialectically evolving “thought-determinations.” Since Hegel’s 
logic is therefore to be construed in the traditional terms of ontology, it “coincides 
with metaphysics” ( 1991 :  § 24). 
 In order to demonstrate that truth can be cognized through pure thought, it first 
has to be shown that the one-sided, finite “forms of cognition,” as represented, 
for example, through Kant’s transcendental account of cognition, are deficient, 
for otherwise logic or metaphysics wouldn’t represent the only possible “Science” 
of “the pure truth itself ” ( 1991 :  § 19). This is compatible with Hegel’s idea of 
the nullification of the finite “forms of cognition” by means of skeptical doubt. 
However, this does not conflict with the view that skepticism cannot function as 
an introduction to metaphysics. For here Hegel explicitly refers to the destructive 
role of skepticism with regard to the finite “forms of cognition” beyond any kind of 
introductory function as in the  Phenomenology : “The high skepticism of antiquity 
accomplishes this by showing that every one of those forms contained a contradiction 
within itself ” ( 1991 :  § 24, Addition 3). As we shall shortly see, “showing that every 
one of those forms contained a contradiction within itself ” indicates the point of 
intersection between dialectic and skepticism. 
 In  On the Relation between Skepticism and Philosophy , Hegel has already argued 
that skepticism is innocuous “[s]ince every genuine philosophy has this negative side” 
( Hegel 2000 : 325). The “negative side” of “every genuine philosophy” is a positive, 
systematic component “implicit in every genuine philosophical system.” In Hegel’s 
eyes, Plato’s  Parmenides along with Spinoza’s  Ethics are ideal representatives of this 
skeptical, “free side of philosophy,” since these works exhibit antinomies according 
to “the principle of skepticism:  panti log ô i logos isos antikeitai” [to every argument 
an equal argument is opposed] ( Hegel 2000 : 324f). 6 The presentation of skepticism 
as the “negative side” of true philosophy indicates Hegel’s mature view of positively 
integrating skepticism into philosophy by assimilating it with dialectic. By means of 
this integrative strategy Hegel intends to immunize metaphysics or, more broadly, 
philosophy against skeptical attacks. This connection between skepticism and 
dialectic is not at all arbitrary, but rather systematically motivated. For according 
to Hegel, 
 the dialectical, taken separately on its own by the understanding, constitutes 
skepticism, especially when it is exhibited in scientific concepts. Skepticism 
contains the mere negation that results from the dialectic. ( 1991 :  § 81)  
 The connection of skepticism and dialectic is justified by means of “negation,” that is, 
in Hegelian terms, through contradiction. However, skepticism is not identical with 
dialectic. Dialectic shows the “one-sidedness and restrictedness of the determinations 
of the understanding” ( 1991 :  § 81), and this means their “negation.” This is also 
accomplished by skepticism in that the skeptic raises doubts and therefore negates 
epistemic claims by opposing them according to the aforementioned principle, 
“ panti log ô i logos isos antikeitai .” Unlike dialectic, skepticism does not go any further 
than demonstrating the “negation” of the “determinations of the understanding.” 
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However, skepticism is capable of recognizing the positive content of its “negation.” 
For this reason skepticism and dialectic coincide only inasmuch as both reveal finite 
understanding’s intrinsic negativity. Nonetheless, finite understanding cannot be 
aware of dialectic itself but exclusively of the skeptical negation of epistemic claims. 
Since finite understanding is incapable of reaching dialectical insights, it must accept 
skepticism as a fundamental threat to its epistemic claims, for without the help 
of dialectical means finite understanding cannot escape from its natural skeptical 
doubts and contradictions. By contrast, “genuine philosophy” itself is not affected 
by skeptical doubts: 
 Skepticism should not be regarded merely as a doctrine of doubt; rather, it is 
completely certain about its central point, i.e., the nullity of everything finite. . . . 
Philosophy, on the other hand, contains the skeptical as a moment within itself—
specifically as the dialectical moment. But then philosophy does not stop at the 
merely negative result of the dialectic, as is the case with skepticism. ( 1991 :  § 81, 
Addition 2)  
 Hence, skepticism and dialectic accord with respect to “negation” while being vitally 
distinct at the same time. Although both likewise rely on “negation,” skepticism 
performs “abstract negation” by simply doubting, that is, nullifying epistemic 
claims, whereas from the point of view of dialectic the “result” of the “negation” 
preserves the positive content which it “resulted from.” Here Hegel draws on the 
 Phenomenology ’s distinction between two kinds of negation. Skepticism’s, that is, 
finite understanding’s (“abstract”) negation merely “wait[s] to see whether something 
new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss” 
( 1977 : sec. 79). By contrast, true, “determinate negation” realizes that, 
 nothingness is, in a determinate fashion, specifically the nothingness of that from 
which it results. For it is only when it is taken as the result from which it emerges, 
that it is, in fact, the true result; in that case it is itself a determinate nothingness, 
one which has a content. ( 1977 : sec. 79, translation modified)  
 Consequently, it is the method of counter-position or negation that makes skepticism 
dialectical and thereby a positive element of rationality. From the immanent point of 
view of human understanding, skeptical counter-position or negation of epistemic 
claims has devastating consequences for rationality since finite understanding’s 
cognitive performances lead naturally and inescapably to skeptical doubt. For finite 
understanding it therefore looks as if the skeptic, by means of counter-position or 
negation, is able to prevent the human mind from successfully achieving positive 
metaphysical knowledge. Hegel does not deny the negative consequences that 
skepticism has for finite understanding. However, he criticizes this destructive view 
of skepticism as one-sided. For him the true positive meaning of skepticism is the 
“dialectical moment,” that is, skepticism’s ability to nullify finite reflection by means 
of skeptical doubt in order to promote all-comprising metaphysical cognition of 
the true. 
 It is important to see that Hegel is not operating with two distinct types of 
skepticism, negative skepticism on the one hand and positive philosophical 
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skepticism on the other. On the contrary, negative and positive philosophical 
skepticism are identical. It is one and the same skeptical doubt that—on the level 
of finite understanding—nullifies reflection while—on the level of dialectic—it 
promotes metaphysical knowledge. This distinction itself is, of course, made from 
a philosophical point of view, that is, it is an insight that cannot be achieved from 
within finite reflection. However, from a dialectical angle, skeptical doubt has to be 
taken as the documentation of true philosophical knowledge. 
 3 PHILOSOPHY, SKEPTICISM, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 
 Hegel’s account of skepticism is a philosophical challenge in many ways. First 
of all, self-fulfilling skepticism claims to be a methodological construction of a 
series of skeptical doubts that promotes true philosophical knowledge. Although 
one can grant Hegel that he is aware of one of the most fundamental problems 
of epistemology, that is, the problem of the criterion, it is hard to see how the 
construction of a series of skeptical doubts is able to face this problem. For the 
skeptic might still question the objectivity of the systematic connections between 
the forms of skeptical doubts that supposedly lead consciousness necessarily to the 
standpoint of true cognition. On the other hand, within the systematically evolved 
forms of skeptical doubts, Hegel discusses many of the skeptical arguments that 
are still debated in the present, like skeptical doubts concerning external world 
beliefs, cognition  a priori , identity, first-person beliefs, morality, or realism, and 
offers astute critical analyses of these arguments. 7 
 Secondly, with respect to the account of skepticism in Hegel’s later work, one 
might question whether “dialectical” skepticism is at all a kind of skepticism. For 
Hegel’s assimilation of skeptical doubt and dialectic seems to violate our ordinary 
understanding of skeptical doubt. Whereas skeptical arguments are supposed to 
support the claim that we cannot know whether our beliefs are true, dialectic is 
designed to bring about metaphysical knowledge. Hence, the skeptic would insist 
that doubt and dialectic are intrinsically incompatible. Hegel would respond that 
the skeptic’s insistence is symptomatic of finite understanding’s incapacity to 
judge metaphysical truth, that is, that true philosophy and skepticism coincide. 
Accordingly, “Science” shows that this kind of criticism is limited to a one-sided 
finite perspective that is to be overcome in the direction of all-comprising true 
philosophy. From the Hegelian angle, to repudiate skeptical doubts would even be 
inefficacious since skepticism is a natural, inescapable problem for human cognition, 
a problem that can never be eliminated from our philosophical examination of the 
question of knowledge. This is a point of intersection between Hegel’s and the more 
recent discussion of skepticism. According to Michael Williams’s interpretation, 
contemporary “New Skeptics” like Stroud and Nagel follow Hume in that they 
“are rightly impressed by the simplicity, brevity and seeming transparency of typical 
skeptical arguments” ( Williams 1996 : xv), that is, they take skepticism to be a natural 
problem. However, the crucial question to be asked is: “Is skepticism really a natural 
or intuitive problem?” For Williams it isn’t since, if it is, “then Hume is right, and we 
will never reconcile everyday attitudes with the results of philosophical reflection” 
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( Williams 1996 : xv). In this case, from the point of view of everyday life, philosophy 
would be irrelevant since what we commonsensically believe to be true in everyday 
life does not carry the heavy burden of fundamental skeptical doubt. The best way 
to deal with this situation is, Williams argues, to offer a “theoretical diagnosis” of 
skepticism that identifies “theoretical ideas” the skeptic holds “that we are by no 
means bound to accept” ( Williams 1996 : xvii). If we do so, we have a good chance 
to overcome skepticism by an alternative account of cognition. Hegel’s strategy 
is similar to Williams’s since, according to his view, skeptical doubts arise from a 
misconceived conception of cognition, that is, one-sided finite cognition that is to be 
overcome by true philosophical “Science.” Philosophical “Science” then prevents us 
from accepting those “theoretical ideas” that naturally force us into skepticism. That 
is, according to Hegel, skeptical doubts are natural as long as we reflect within the 
theoretical framework of, for example, Kantian subjectivism. For Kant’s restriction 
of cognition to appearances as ordinary objects of everyday life leads naturally into 
skepticism about things in themselves, that is, about things as they really are. In 
order to escape this kind of skepticism and to therefore eliminate unnatural doubts, 
Hegel asks us to give the theoretical framework that like Kantian subjectivism makes 
skepticism unavoidable. With respect to the claim that skeptical doubts are unnatural 
as long as we subscribe to certain kinds of theoretical frameworks, Hegel therefore 
concurs with Williams’s theoretical diagnosis. However, unlike Williams, Hegel 
argues that skepticism itself makes indeed a positive contribution to this insight 
in that skeptical doubts should be understood as the flipside of true philosophical 
“Science.” Skeptical arguments like Agrippa’s trilemma or Kant’s antinomies of 
pure reason point to the finiteness of ordinary human cognition that Hegel aims 
to overcome by absolute idealism, according to which true philosophical cognition 
is possible. For absolute idealism skeptical doubts are unnatural, on the one hand, 
but they remain everlasting historical facts on the other. Although as historical 
appearances they are unnatural as such, they are at the same time manifestations 
of the shortcomings of the human mind and hence move rationality towards true 
philosophy. In this sense true philosophy is a kind of skepticism. 
 NOTES 
 1. This article will not be concerned with Hegel’s early views of the relation between 
logic and metaphysics that pave the way for his later account of skepticism. For 
more details, see Heidemann ( 2011 : 81–84), from which I draw in my current 
interpretation of Hegelian skepticism. For the broader context, see D ü sing ( 1995 : 
chs. 2 and 3). 
 2. On the “history of self-consciousness,” see also Breazeale ( 2001 ), D ü sing ( 1993 ), 
and Heidemann (2009: 16–19). 
 3. For a more detailed analysis of the skeptical argument in “Sense certainty” and 
“Perception,” see Heidemann ( 2011 : 88–92). 
 4. On the methodological differentiation between the standpoint of consciousness in 
process and the standpoint of the philosopher, see Heidemann ( 2007 : 245–271). 
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 5. Hegel, after 1807, in fact gives up the view that the  Phenomenology serves as such 
an introduction, although he does not give up the  Phenomenology itself. On Hegel’s 
later reappraisal of the relation between the  Phenomenology of Spirit and the 
 Science of Logic , see Heidemann ( 2007 : 327–339). 
 6. By “principle of skepticism” Hegel alludes to Sextus Empiricus ( 1933 : I 12). The 
use of “antinomy” not only refers to the antinomies of the  Parmenides but also to 
the antinomies of pure reason in Kant’s first  Critique and possibly to the antithetical 
structure of the principles in Fichte’s  Doctrine of Science . 
 7. I cannot elaborate here on Hegel’s worthwhile discussion of these arguments, but 
I have done so in Heidemann ( 2007 ). 
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